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Schwartz: Litigation under Section 1983

CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 1983 AND
THE BIVENS DOCTRINE
IN THE OCTOBER 2008 TERM
Martin A. Schwartz*

INTRODUCTION

Section 1983' is the major enforcer of individual federal
constitutional rights. It authorizes individuals to enforce their
constitutional rights against state and local officials; for example,
prison officers and police officers, and against municipalities. It is
the most important civil statute in American law. To its credit, the
United States Supreme Court understands the significance of § 1983.
Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.B.A., cum laude, 1966, City College of New
York; J.D., magna cum laude, 1968, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1973, New York
University School of Law. Professor Schwartz has authored leading treatises including
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (4th ed. 2004-2006), SECTION 1983
LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2007), and SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (2007). Professor Schwartz is also the author of a bi-monthly column for the
New York Law Journalentitled "Public Interest Law." He is lead author of SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, SECOND EDITION (Federal Judicial Center 2008). He chairs the Practising Law
Institute's annual program on Section 1983 litigation and co-chairs its annual Supreme Court
Review and Trial Evidence programs. This Article is based on a presentation given at the
Practising Law Institute's Eleventh Annual Supreme Court Review Program in New York
City, New York.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2009). The statute states, in pertinent part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Id.
*
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For the past three decades, in virtually every single Term of the
Court, it has decided a substantial number of cases dealing with
different facets of § 1983 litigation.2 Last Term, there was an
unusual number of § 1983 decisions rendered by the United States
Supreme Court, which represent a mixed bag of pro-plaintiff/prodefendant decisions. My own evaluation is that-on the whole-the
defendants prevailed on the more important issues.
This Article will discuss the Supreme Court decisions of last
Term in six areas of § 1983 litigation: (1) constitutional rights
enforceable under § 1983; (2) pleading requirements; (3) supervisory
liability; (4) prosecutorial immunity; (5) qualified immunity; and (6)
state court § 1983 actions against corrections officers.

I.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE UNDER SECTION

1983
The most fundamental principle of § 1983 law is that the
statute, itself, does not create any rights, but authorizes the
enforcement of federal constitutional rights against state and local
officials, and in some cases, enforcement of federal statutory rights as
well. This means that the significance of § 1983 is greatly dependent
upon the extent to which the United States Supreme Court recognizes
individual constitutionally-protected rights. Potentially, a very broad
range of constitutional rights are enforceable under § 1983.
Sometimes an issue arises whether a particular federal
statutory scheme was intended to preclude enforcement of a federal
constitutional claim under § 1983. That was the issue for the
Supreme Court last Term in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School
Committee.3 The complaint asserted a sexual harassment claim by a
public school student against school officials and the school
committee, which is analogous to a school district. The plaintiff
alleged a violation of Title IX of the educational amendments of
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); McMillian v. Monroe County,
Ala.,
520 U.S. 781 (1997); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of
Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
' 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009).
2
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1972-which prohibited gender discrimination in federally-funded
educational programs-and a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause under § 1983.4 The defendants took the position that Title IX
was intended by Congress to preclude the assertion of a § 1983 Equal
Protection Clause claim.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Alito, rejected the defendants' argument, holding that the
plaintiff was entitled to assert the § 1983 equal protection claim.6
What is most significant about the Court's decision is its language,
which supports a strong presumption that federal statutory schemes
should not be interpreted to preclude assertion of § 1983
constitutional claims. This presumption is especially strong when the
scope of the federal statutory protection and the § 1983 constitutional
claim are not the same.7 In this case, there were significant
differences. For example, Title IX only reaches federally-funded
educational organizations, while § 1983 is not so limited; on the other
hand, Title IX reaches private schools, while § 1983 applies only to
state actors.8
The Fitzgerald decision does not deal with the question of
whether Title IX, itself, is enforceable under § 1983. On the separate
question of whether particular federal statutes may be enforced under
§ 1983, the Supreme Court, in recent years, has been very prodefendant and stingy in recognizing enforcement of federal statues
under § 1983.9
The issue in Fitzgerald, however, was the
4 Id. at 792.

See id at 797 n.2.
6 Id. at 797.

Id. at 796-97.
A comparison of the substantive rights and protections guaranteed under
Title IX and under the Equal Protection Clause . . . support[s] .

.

. the

conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX to preclude [§] 1983
constitutional suits. Title IX's protections are narrower in some respects
and broader in others. Because the protections guaranteed by the two
sources of law diverge in this way, we cannot agree . . . that "Congress

saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to
be free from gender discrimination perpetrated by educational
institutions."
Fitzgerald, 129 S. Ct. at 796 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165,
179 (1st Cir. 2007).
8 Id

9 See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) ("[I]f Congress wishes to
create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms-
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enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, a constitutional claim
under § 1983.
The second constitutional decision was a high-visibility case
called District Attorney's Office v. Osborne.'0 The issue there was
whether a convicted criminal defendant has a due process right of
access to evidence for the purpose of DNA testing." The Court, in a
five-to-four decision-the typical five-to-four alignment (Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito in the majority, with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer in dissent)-held that there is no such due process right.12
One issue in the case was whether this claim was even assertable
under § 1983. The defendants argued that Osborne's due process
claims had to be asserted in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, with
all the limitations imposed on the federal habeas remedy.' 3 The
plaintiff argued that he could assert his due process claims under
§ 1983.14 The Court sidestepped that issue by holding that even if it
is assumed that the claims were assertable under § 1983, it would not
matter because a convicted defendant does not have a procedural due
process or substantive due process right to access evidence for the
purpose of DNA testing-even at the defendant's own expense.' 5
Chief Justice Roberts's decision relied heavily on the fact that
forty-six state legislative bodies and Congress had enacted some type
of policy dealing with the right of post-conviction DNA testing. 16
The Court reasoned that, given these legislative developments,
no less and no more than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable
under an implied private right of action.").
'0 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
" Id. at 2316.
12

Id. at 2323.

The Court of Appeals below relied only on procedural due process, but
Osborne seeks to defend the judgment on the basis of substantive due
process as well. He asks that we recognize a freestanding right to DNA
evidence untethered from the liberty interests he hopes to vindicate with
it. We reject the invitation and conclude, in the circumstances of this
case, that there is no such substantive due process right.
Id. at 2322.
" Id. at 2318.
14 See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2318.

" Id. at 2323 ("Establishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for testing
would force us to act as policymakers, and our substantive-due-process rulemaking authority
would not only have to cover the right of access but a myriad of other issues.").
16 Id. at 2316.
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constitutionalizing the issue would be unnecessary and unwholesome,
and would intrude improperly into these legislative processes.17 In
the author's view, this is troublesome reasoning because either a
convicted criminal defendant has a due process right to DNA testing,
or he does not. In other words, either Osborne's due process rights
were violated, or they were not violated. The answer to that question
should not depend upon what legislative bodies around the country
happen to be doing or not doing. The whole purpose of the Bill of
Rights was to provide independent individual constitutional
protections that exist regardless of how other branches of the
government may be operating.
The Court employed the same fallacious reasoning in 2006, in
Garcetti v. Ceballos," where the Supreme Court severely narrowed
the First Amendment protections of public employees, holding that a
public employee's speech pursuant to the employee's official
responsibilities was categorically unprotected.19 In other words, such
public employee speech is automatically unprotected without any
balancing or weighing of competing interests. Part of the reasoning
in Garcetti was that the states around the country have whistleblower laws, and therefore, employees may seek protection under
those laws. 20 The problem, of course, is that those whistle-blower
statutes come in all shapes and sizes, and there is nothing to prevent a
state from repealing its law, or narrowing its protections. The whole
idea of the Bill of Rights protections is to give individuals protections
that stand firm regardless of the legislative response.

II.

PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

The second category is pleading requirements for federal
court civil complaints, which features the case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal.21
The commentary around the country about Ashcroft was extreme; it
was described by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as the most
" Id. at 2322.

s 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 424. "We reject. . . the notion that the First Amendment shields from discipline
the expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties. Our precedents do not
support the existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public
employee makes in the course of doing his or her job." Id. at 426.
20 Contra id at 440-41 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
21 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
19
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important civil case of the Term. 22 Another law professor described
it as "a blockbuster decision," 23 and Supreme Court practitioner
Thomas Goldstein said, it was "the most significant Supreme Court
decision in a decade." 24
Ashcroft was a Bivens action against the former Attorney
General, Ashcroft, and the director of the FBI, Muller.2 5 The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that they had illegally adopted, with a
discriminatory intent, a policy calling for harsh treatment of post-9/1 1
detainees.26 Although Ashcroft was not a § 1983 case, everything
that the Supreme Court held regarding pleadings also applies to
§ 1983 actions. It was a five-to-four decision; the Court held that the
complaint allegations against these high-level federal officials were
insufficient to state a claim for relief under the 2007 decision in Bell
Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly.2 7 Bell Atlantic significantly
tightened up pleadings standards for federal court civil complaints,
and in the same vein, the Supreme Court retired the familiar Conley
v. Gibson28 "no set of facts" standard, which was a lenient proplaintiff standard that was used on a motion to dismiss.2 9
Ashcroft is significant because it made clear that Bell Atlantic
was not applicable only to antitrust cases, and that the new pleading
standards-requiring that the plaintiff allege facts, not mere
conclusions, and facts that constitute a plausible claim, not just a
speculative or a possible claim-apply to all federal court civil
complaints, and therefore include complaints filed under § 1983 and
22 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court Moves to the Right, Perhaps
Sharply to the

Right, CAL. ST. B.J., July 2009, availableat http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbarcbj.jsp?
sCategoryPath=/Home/Attomey%20Resources/Califomia%20Baro20Joumal/July2O9&sC
atHtmliPath=cbj/2009-08_TH_01_supremecourt.html&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines
("For those who handle civil litigation in federal court, no decision was more important than
Iqbal v. Ashcroft.").
23 Trey Childress, United States Congress Considering Legislation Relating to Pleading
(July 23, 2009), http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/united-states-congress-consideringlegislationrelating-to-pleading/.
24 Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2009, at AlO (" 'Iqbal is the most significant Supreme Court decision in a
decade for day-to-day litigation in the federal courts,' said Thomas C. Goldstein, an
appellate lawyer with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld in Washington.").
25 Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.
26 *Id. at 1944.
27 Id. at 1950-51.
28 355 U.S. 41
(1957).
29 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557, 563 (2007).
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under Bivens.3 0
Nobody really knows how to determine what a plausible
claim is; one law professor said, " 'plausibility is in the eye of the
beholder.' "3' The Supreme Court cited the Second Circuit decision
in Ashcroft, saying that "determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim .

.

. [is] .

.

. a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense." 32 The five-to-four split-the dissenters did not hold that the
plausibility standard does not apply-shows that there are going to be
differences of opinion among federal jurists as to whether a
complaint alleges a plausible claim for relief.
One of the important facets of this decision is the Court's
ruling that the ability of the trial judge to narrowly tailor discovery
does not change the plausibility pleading standard.3 3 It seems that
Bell Atlantic and Iqbal are largely fueled by what is viewed as
discovery abuses gone wild all over the country, and that the more
rigorous pleading standard is the way to nip those abuses in the bud.
Regardless, Bell Atlantic and Iqbal set up, potentially in many cases,
a "catch-22" for plaintiffs' lawyers, because the Court is saying the
plaintiff has to allege facts that constitute a plausible claim, while the
plaintiffs lawyer needs discovery in order to be able to allege those
facts. But the Court holds that unless the plaintiff asserts a plausible
claim, the plaintiff cannot get to discovery.
Another important aspect to the Ashcroft case is the Supreme
Court's ruling that it may not even be enough for the complaint to
allege facts that constitute a plausible claim. The Iqbal complaint
alleged that the defendants acted with discriminatory intent, but the
Court said that there was a more plausible explanation for what these
high-ranking officials were doing, namely that they were acting in the
interest of national security instead of intending to discriminate on
the basis of race, national origin, or religion.3 4 The Court ruled that
the more plausible explanation will control, and the plaintiffs claim

30 Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, 1953.
31 Melinda Hanson, Civil Cases: Iqbal, Ricci, Wyeth, NAMUDNO Tagged as Landmark
Opinions of Term, 78 U.S.L.W. 1042 (July 21, 2009) (quoting Stephen C. Yeazell, Professor
of Law, UCLA School of Law).
32 Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
" See id. at 1953.
34 Id. at 1951.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2011], Art. 9

TOURO LAWREVIEW

538

[Vol. 26

will not be found plausible.3 5 This is especially troubling because it
enables a court to engage in fact-finding, unsupported by evidence, at
the pleading stage.

III.

SUPERVISORY LIABILITY

The criticism that has been leveled, wide-spread, against
Ashcroft has been on the pleading issue. Yet there is a second issue
that, for plaintiffs' lawyers, may well turn out to be quite pernicious
for civil rights plaintiffs, which is the liability of supervisory
officials. Ashcroft can be interpreted as holding that, because there is
no respondeat superior liability either in § 1983 actions or Bivens
actions, there is no such doctrine as "supervisory liability." The
Court went so far as to say, " 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer," 36
and that a supervisor's liability is to be evaluated in the same way as
any other government official. This means that a supervisor cannot
be held liable-legally responsible-for the conduct of her
subordinates, for example, by deliberately not training, supervising,
or taking corrective action. For liability to attach, the supervisor
herself must be shown to have engaged in conduct that caused the
violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.38 This is the dissent's
reading of the majority opinion.3 9 In the end, this part of the Iqbal
35 Id. at 1951-52.

[R]espondent alleges the arrests . . . were likely lawful and justified by
his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present
in the United States and who had potential connections to those who
committed terrorist acts.
As between that "obvious alternative
explanation" for the arrests ... and the purposeful, invidious
discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a
plausible conclusion.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
36 Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
37id.
In . . . determining whether there is a violation of clearly established

right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is
required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for
unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official
charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent
responsibilities.
Id
38

id.

39 See id at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The majority says that a Bivens action, 'where
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decision may prove very harmful to plaintiffs' lawyers. At this point
in time, lower court judges do not yet know what to do with this part
of Ashcroft v. Iqbal; pre-Ashcroft, each circuit formulated decisional
law articulating doctrines that govern constitutional claims against
supervisory officials. 40 Each circuit will now have to reconsider its
law in light of Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
The Court in Iqbal softened the blow to the plaintiff in two
respects. First, the Court pointed out that the lower-ranked officials
remained in the case as defendants. 4 1 Second, the last sentence of the
Court's opinion said, "[t]he Court of Appeals should decide . . .
whether to remand to the District Court so that [the] respondent can
seek leave to amend his deficient complaint." 4 2
IV.

PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY

Victims of wrongful convictions suffered a serious setback in
the Osborne case-losing the due process right to post-conviction
DNA testing. They suffered another important setback in Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein.4 3 In Goldstein, the Court rejected a § 1983
wrongful conviction claim on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. 44
Goldstein was incarcerated for twenty-four years for a homicide it
turned out he did not commit.45 He was eventually released on a
habeas corpus petition and was not re-prosecuted.46 Goldstein's
masters do not answer for the torts of their servants,' 'the term 'supervisory liability' is a
misnomer,' and that '[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.' " (quoting Ashcroft, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949 (majority opinion))).
40 Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1957, 1958; MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES ch. 7 (4th ed. 2005).
41' Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (majority opinion).
42 Id. at 1954.
43 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009).
4 Id. at 858-59.
We ask whether . . . immunity extends to claims that the prosecution
failed to disclose impeachment material . . . due to: (1) a failure . . . to

train prosecutors, (2) a failure . . . to supervise prosecutors, or (3) a
failure to establish an information system containing potential
impeachment material about informants.
We conclude that . . .
immunity extends to all these claims.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
45 Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007).
46 id.
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attorneys claimed that this wrongful conviction came about because
the trial prosecutor did not turn over Brady impeachment material
relating to favorable treatment the District Attorney's Office gave to
a jail informant in other cases.
After being released, Goldstein brought a § 1983 action;
Goldstein's attorneys understood prosecutorial immunity, so they did
not sue the trial prosecutor. They knew that a Brady claim against
the trial prosecutor was destined to fail, because it would be based
upon the prosecutor's advocacy function and thus defeated by
prosecutorial immunity. 48 Therefore, they sued the District Attorney
and the District Attorney's chief deputy, alleging that the trial
prosecutor's failure to turn over the impeachment material stemmed
from the District Attorney and his chief deputy's failure to supervise,
train, and establish informational systems within the District
Attorney's Offices. 49 The plaintiff's lawyers argued that these claims
were not covered by prosecutorial immunity, because they contested
administrative action-not advocacy.o They won in district court5 '
and in circuit court,52 but when the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, it appeared likely that the circuit court decision
would be overruled. In the oral argument, sure enough, the Justices
had no trouble seeing right through the strategy of the plaintiffs
lawyers.
Therefore, it was not surprising, after the oral argument,
that the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, and held that the District
Attorney and the District Attorney's chief deputy were protected by
absolute prosecutorial immunity. 54
Goldstein is an important decision in this respect: the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the contested conduct by these
defendants was administrative action, but reasoned that it was an
47 Id. at 1171-72.
48 See id. at 1172.

Id. at 1171-72 (noting the officials in charge of administrative matters at the time).
SO Goldstein, 481 F.3d at 1172 ("Goldstein ... alleges that [the defendants] violated his
constitutional rights by failing to adequately train and supervise deputy district attorneys to
ensure that they shared information regarding jailhouse informants with their colleagues.").
" See Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 859 (2009).
52 id.
53 See id. at 861-62; Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-40, Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. 855
(2009) (No. 07-854).
S4 Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. at 864-65 ("[W]e conclude that [the defendants] are entitled to
absolute immunity in respect to Goldstein's claims that their supervision, training, or
information-system management was constitutionally inadequate.").
49
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administrative action closely linked to the trial process-to the
advocacy function of the trial prosecutor-and therefore the
defendants were protected by absolute immunity.55
What is
significant is that this is the first time that prosecutorial immunity has
been extended by the Supreme Court to prosecutors' administrative
conduct.
V.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Safford Unified School DistrictNo. 1 v. Redding56 is a good
example of how a plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation, yet
wind up not recovering anything, partially because of qualified
immunity. The key issue on qualified immunity was whether the
defendant school officials violated clearly-established federal law.
Eight Justices found that the strip search by school officials of the
plaintiff for buprofen violated the Fourth Amendment.57
Nevertheless, when the "clearly-established federal law" qualified
immunity test was applied in Redding, six of the Justices who found a
Fourth Amendment violation concluded that the defendant officials
were protected by qualified immunity because the pertinent Fourth
Amendment law governing student searches was not clearly
established.5 8 Two Justices-Justices Ginsburg and Stevens-found
that the law was clearly established. 59 They thought that it did not
take a constitutional scholar to conclude that the strip search was so
excessively intrusive as to clearly violate the Fourth Amendment.
Conversely, Justice Thomas said there was no Fourth Amendment
violation at all. 60 The range of these positions demonstrates that it is
sometimes difficult to figure out whether the governing federal law
" See id. at 861-63.
56 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
5 Id. at 2637, 2644; id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id
at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
ss Id. at 2644 (majority opinion). "[T]he cases viewing school strip searches differently
from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting
opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law."
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
5 Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("This is, in essence, a
case in which clearly established law meets clearly outrageous conduct."); id. at 2645
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6o Id. at 2646 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that
the search . .. did not violate the Fourth Amendment.").
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was clearly established or not.
Last term's other qualified immunity case was Pearson v.
Callahan.61 Prior to Pearson, when qualified immunity was a
defense, the Supreme Court said that a court had to follow a two-step
process: first, the court must determine whether a constitutional
violation is alleged; and second, if so, the court must determine if the
constitutional law was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.6 2 Many lower federal court judges objected to the
mandatory nature of this two-step process. Many judges asked:
"Why do I have to deal with this difficult constitutional question?
Can I not just say, even if there was a constitutional violation, the law
was not clearly established?"
Sure enough, the Court in Pearson overruled the mandatory
nature of the two-step approach and gave the lower courts discretion
whether to follow it, -or to proceed directly to the second step of
whether the defendant violated clearly established federal law.6 3 In
some circumstances, it may make sense first to decide the
constitutional merits issue in order to further the interest in resolving
constitutional issues that are not likely to be litigated in other
contexts, such as § 1983 municipal liability claims and criminal
prosecutions. In other circumstances, it may make sense for the court
to jump directly to the second clearly established federal law step. A
court has discretion to determine which approach to take.

VI.

STATE COURT SECTION 1983 ACTIONS AGAINST
CORRECTIONS OFFICERS

A New York statute prohibits claims for damages against
corrections officers from being asserted in the New York State
courts.6 This includes claims asserted under § 1983.5 The Supreme
61

129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).

Id. at 815-16 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
63 Id.at 818.
6 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24(1) (McKinney 2009). The statute states, in pertinent part,
that:
No civil action shall be brought in any court of the state, except by the
attorney general on behalf of the state, against any officer or employee
of the department, in his personal capacity, for damages arising out of
any act done or the failure to perform any act within the scope of the
employment and in the discharge of the duties by such officer or
employee.
62
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Court, in Haywood v. Drown,6 6 held, in a five-to-four decision, that
the New York law violated the Supremacy Clause, because it was
contrary to the purposes of § 1983.67 States authorizing the assertion
of § 1983 claims in their state courts-and all states do so-cannot
pick and choose between or among different types of § 1983 claims.6 8
The extremeness of Justice Thomas' dissent is alarming. Justice
Thomas advanced the position that states can do whatever they want
with their state court system; states can decide to hear federal claims
or not hear federal claims as they so choose, and that the Supremacy
Clause does not limit this exercise of state power. 69 Fortunately, he
was the only Justice who took this position.

Id
65
6
67
68
69

Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2112 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 2108.

Id. at 2115.
Id.
Id. at 2122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Under our federal system, therefore, the States have unfettered authority
to determine whether their local courts may entertain a federal cause of
action. Once a State exercises its sovereign prerogative to deprive its
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action, it is
the end of the matter as a far as the Constitution is concerned.

Id.
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